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COMMENTS
THE ADIISSIBILITY OF DYING DECLARATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been said that of all the exceptions to the hearsay rule, the dying
declaration is the "most mystical in its theory and the most arbitrary in its
limitations."' In recent years the dying declaration exception has been attacked
by several writers. 2 It has been suggested that dying declarations should not be
admitted in either civil or criminal cases.3
In 1968 the Supreme Court, in Bruton v. United States,4 held that the ad-
mission of an out-of-court inculpatory statement of one co-defendant, in a
joint trial, violated the confrontation clause of the sixth amendments because
it deprived the other co-defendant of his right of cross-examination. The Court
reasoned that, despite instructions to the contrary, there was a substantial risk
that the jury would look to the extrajudicial incriminatory statements of one
co-defendant to determine the guilt of the other co-defendant. Bruton and
other recent Supreme Court decisions, together with the general infirmities of
the doctrine itself, cast doubt on the reliability and constitutionality of the
dying declaration.
II. APPLICATION OF THE DYING DECLARATION
Dying declarations are admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule when
they are made by declarants who are dead at the time of trial7 and who, at the
time they made the declaration, believed that their death was near and certain.8
It must also appear that the declarant, if living, would have been competent to
1. C. McCormick, Law of Evidence § 258 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCormick].
2. Quick, Some Reflections on Dying Declarations, 6 How. L.J. 109 (1960); Note, Dying
Declarations in Louisiana Law, 22 La. L. Rev. 651 (1962); Note, Evidence-Admissibility
of Dying Declarations in Civil Actions, 16 Va. L. Rev. 825 (1930).
3. 16 Va. L. Rev., supra note 2, at 829.
4. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). This was a 6-2 decision of the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice
Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
5. U.S. Const. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . be
confronted with the witnesses against him . .. .
6. 391 U.S. at 135-36.
7. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 4 Ariz. App. 327, 420 Pa2d 194
(1966). 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1431 (3d. ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as Wigmorel.
8. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933); People v. Beier, 29 Ill. 2d 511, 194
N.E.2d 280 (1963) ; Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543, 171 A.2d 699, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 906
(1961). The evidence that the declarant believes that his death is near and certain may come
from his own statement. Miller v. Goodwin, 246 Ark. 540, 439 S.W.2d 308 (1969), but it
will usually come from the circumstances surrounding his death. Circumstances which would
tend to show that the declarant believed his death to be near and certain would include the
fact that the declarant had received the last rites, or the type of wound from which the
declarant was suffering. Wigmore § 1442.
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testify.9 Moreover, dying declarations are admissible only in trials for homicide,
where the accused is charged with the death of the declarant.' 0 This last re-
striction has been criticized by many writers." Professor Wigmore points out
that the restriction of dying declarations to homicides developed because the
"misconstrued words of a treatise-writer, followed by a 'nisi prius' decision or
two, started a heresy which ... limits the [dying declaration's] use to criminal
cases of 'homicide."'2 The text writer to whom Wigmore was referring was
Serjeant East who, in Pleas of the Crown'3 said:
Besides the usual evidence of guilt in general cases of felony .... there is one kind ol
evidence more peculiar to the case of homicide, which is the declaration of the
deceased after the mortal blow, as to the fact itself, and the party by whom it was
committed. Evidence of this sort is admissible in this case on the fullest necessity;
for it often happens that there is no third person present to be an eye-witness to the
fact; and the usual witness on occasion of other felonies, namely, the party injured
himself, is gotten rid of.14
At early common law, the English courts made no distinction between receiving
dying declarations in criminal or civil cases. 1 A good example of the early view
is the case of Wright v. Littler,16 in which Lord Mansfield admitted a dying
declaration in an action of ejectment.Y7 Although no authority was cited by
Serjeant East' 8 for his assertion that dying declarations were peculiar to
homicide cases,19 and even though the early common law view was to the con-
9. The declarant may be impeached in the normal manner. Hutcherson v. State, 40 Ala.
App. 77, 108 So. 2d 177, cert. denied, 268 Ala. 696, 108 So. 2d 180 (1958). The declarant
must have had first hand knowledge; he must have perceived the facts contained in his
dying declaration. See Quick, supra note 2, at 114-15 for a discussion of the fact that many
cases which reject statements of the declarant for violation of the opinion rule are, In fact,
grounded on the failure of the proponent of the evidence to show that the declarant person-
ally perceived the facts contained in his declaration. See also Wigmore § 1447. In addition,
the dying declaration must concern the facts leading to, causing, or attending the injurious act
which has resulted in the declarant's death. See Wigmore § 1434 n.1 for collected cases.
10. See note 21 infra.
11. See, e.g., Ryan, Dying Declarations in Civil Actions, 10 B.U.L. Rev. 470, 485-87
(1930); Smith, Dying Declarations, 3 Wis. L. Rev. 193, 197-209 (1925); 25 Mich. L. Rev,
673 (1927); 21 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 106, 107-08 (1948); 61 W. Va. L. Rev. 132, 139-40
(1959).
12. Wigmore § 1431.
13. S. East, 1 Pleas of the Crown (1803).
14. Id. at 353.
15. Smith, supra note 11, at 202.
16. 97 Eng. Rep. 812 (K.B. 1761).
17. See also The King v. Drummond, 168 Eng. Rep. 271 (Cr. 1784) (defendant Indicted
for robbery).
18. See note 13 supra.
19. Smith, supra note 11, at 206.
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trary, his position has become the majority view in the United States. One
of the reasons why the majority of American courts have been reluctant to
extend the dying declaration to cases other than homicide appears to be a
reluctance to approve departures from the general rule excluding hearsay.21
Logically, it would seem that the admissibility of a dying declaration should not hinge
upon the type of case in which it is offered in evidence. But it may be that the
common law "heretical" limitation has operated as a salutory check upon the "dying
declarations" exception itself-an exception reluctantly made by the courts . .. and
an exception which most courts apply with great caution. Perhaps the limitation was
but a refusal (albeit an illogical refusal) to extend what might be said to be an
unsound exception to the hearsay rule. In other words, it may be that the illogical
insistence of courts that the use of dying declarations be limited to homicide cases
results from their natural disinclination to approve departures from the basic general
rule excluding hearsay testimony.22
Another reason advanced for refusing to admit dying declarations other than
in homicide cases is that a dying declarant who has a family would be tempted
to falsify his statement in a civil case where a pecuniary recovery is the measure
of damagesPm
Although the restrictive view of the dying declaration is still the majority
view, there has been a gradual extension of the dying declaration exception by
legislative enactment and decisional law. In Thurston v. Fritz24 the Kansas
Supreme Court held that the dying declaration of a grantor concerning the cir-
cumstances of the sale of his farm was admissible in an action on the contract
for the sale of the land.25 Since the decision in Thurston only one other court
has, without the aid of a statute, expressly adopted the Thurston doctrine.20
20. E.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 4 Ariz. App. 327, 420 P.2d
194 (1966); Phillips v. Dow Chem. Co., 247 Miss. 293, 151 So. 2d 199 (1963). In Cummings
v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 364 Mo. 868, 269 S.W.2d 111 (1954), the Missouri Supreme Court
felt that if there was to be an extension of the dying declaration exception to the hearsay
rule, it should be accomplished by the legislature. Accord, People v. Allen, 300 N.Y. 222,
228, 90 N.E.2d 48, 51 (1949) where the New York Court of Appeals said: "The settled
rules as to dying declarations 'may not be broadened except by statute,' quoting People v.
Becker, 215 N.Y. 126, 146, 109 N.E. 127, 133 (1915).
21. Cummings v. llinois Cent. R.R., 364 Mo. 868, 269 S.W2d 111 (19S4).
22. Id. at 877, 269 S.W.2d at 120.
23. Marler v. Texas & P. Ry., 52 La. Ann. 727, 742, 27 So. 176, 182 (1900).
24. 91 Kan. 468, 138 P. 625 (1914).
25. Id. at 470-71, 138 P. at 626-27. The Thurston rule has been followed in Kansas by
Vassar v. Swift & Co, 106 Kan. 836, 189 P. 943 (1920), and McDonnell v. Sift & Co., 124
Kan. 327, 259 P. 695 (1927). Both of these cases involved Workman's Compensation claims.
See Helm v. Hines, 109 Kan. 48, 196 P. 426 (1921) (wrongful death action).
26. McCredie v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 142 Ore. 229, 20 P.2d 232 (1933). This was
an action by the beneficiary on a personal accident insurance policy. In order to prove the
accidental death of the insured, the beneficiary offered the dying declaration of the insured
as evidence of cause of death. The Oregon Supreme Court was, however, aided in reaching
its decision to admit the dying declaration by an Oregon statute which had been amended
1970]
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Dying declarations have also been admitted in wrongful death actions,2 7 negli-
gence actions,28 and in actions to revoke the license of a physician who per-
formed a criminal abortion resulting in death.20
While state legislatures have been almost as reluctant as the courts to extend
dying declarations to cases other than homicide, there are several states that
have liberal statutes. Only two states, Colorado" and Oregon,8 1 have statutes
which provide that a dying declaration may be admitted in all civil or criminal
cases. However, other states have enacted legislation allowing dying declara-
tions in wrongful death actions, where the declaration is used at the trial of the
person who is alleged to have been responsible for the declarant's death.8 2 Other
jurisdictions have passed statutes allowing dying declarations in quasi-criminal
bastardy proceedings, 3 and some allow the dying declaration of the deceased
woman in prosecutions for abortion.34
Rule 63(5) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence88 makes certain changes in
the common law relating to dying declarations in civil cases as well as criminal
prosecutions. The content of the dying declaration is not restricted to an
exposition of the circumstances attending the death of the declarant.80 Rule
63(5) also omits any requirement that the deceased declarant be the victim of
defendant's crime in a criminal prosecution, or that he be a party who is
represented in a civil action. The liberality of the Rule has been criticized.8 7
to strike out the limiting phrase, "in criminal actions." This permitted the inference that the
legislature intended to allow the admission of dying declarations in civil actions.
27. E.g., Williams v. Randolph & C. Ry., 182 N.C. 267, 108 S.E. 915 (1921); Latham v.
Andrews Mfg. Co., 180 N.C. 627, 105 S.E. 423 (1920). Both of these decisions were based
on a North Carolina statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28-173 (1966), which admits dying declara-
tions in wrongful death actions. See also Barsch v. Hammond, 110 Colo. 441, 135 P.2d 519
(1943).
28. See Stevens v. Stevens, 255 Mich. 363, 94 N.W.2d 858 (1959), which held that the
admission of a dying declaration in a negligence action was not error where there was
sufficient other evidence of negligence.
29. State ex rel. Sorensen v. Lake, 121 Neb. 331, 236 N.W. 762 (1931).
30. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-20 (1963).
31. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 41.900 (1968). See also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233 § 64 (1932).
32. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28-173 (1966) ; Quick, supra note 2, at 121.
33. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-712 (1947); Miss. Code Ann. § 391 (1942); N.M.
Stat. Ann. 22-4-14 (1953).
34. See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 546.310 (1959); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.17 (1953).
35. The Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(5) provides that: "A statement by a person
unavailable as a witness because of his death if the judge finds that it was made voluntarily
and in good faith and while the declarant was conscious of his impending death and believed
that there was no hope of his recovery . . . ." may be admitted.
36. Id. For a discussion of the prior law on this point, see Wigmore § 1434.
37. E.g., Note, Evidence-A Comparison of the New York and Uniform Rules on Ad.
missibility of Hearsay Evidence, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1100 (1956); See Falknor, The Hearsay
Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 43, 65 n.74 (1954) for a discussion of the
overlapping similarities and differences between Uniform Rule 63(4) and 63(5).
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III. RATIONALE Op THE DYING DEcLARATioN
While it has been recognized that dying declarations are not always true3s
and in many cases are contradictory, 9 they have been admitted as an exception
to the hearsay rule because of an historical belief in their reliability, and be-
cause of necessity. It had long been believed that a man about to die and meet
his maker would be unwilling to die with a lie on his lips.40 As Dean Wigmore
stated, "[a]l Courts have agreed, with more or less difference of language, that
the approach of death produces a state of mind in which the utterances of the
dying person are to be taken as free from all ordinary motives to mis-state."4 1
Nineteenth century courts in both the United States and England, reflecting
that century's "practically universal belief in a system of rewards and punish-
ments to follow moral dissolution,"42 accepted this circumstantial guarantee of
reliability as the equivalent of an oath and cross-examination. 43 The "divine
retribution" rationale underlying the acceptance of the reliability of dying
declarations has been severely criticized 44 and is looked upon with suspicion by
some courts.4 5 They question whether a rule based on nineteenth century
religious beliefs has relevance in today's society: 46
38. E.g., Carver v. United States, 164 US. 694, 697 (1897); People v. Falletto, 202 N.Y.
494, 499-500, 96 N.E. 355, 357-58 (1911), wherein Judge Vann said "[elxperence shows
that dying declarations are not always true.... Men sometimes lie even when facing death,
as has frequently been known of convicts about to be executed, and the motive of self-
exoneration which induced them to lay the crime on someone else might move a declarant
to say that the accused was the aggressor by committing the first assault. Experience shows
that dying persons have made self-serving declarations, such as false accusations, in order
to destroy their enemies, and false excuses in order to save their friends." See also White v.
State, 30 Tex. App. 652, 18 S.W. 462 (1892) where the decedent first stated that a Mr.
Mason, along with two other persons that the decedent named, shot him. Shortly there-
after, the decedent said that only Mr. Mason knew of the plan to murder him. Both accusa-
tions as to the complicity of Mr. Mason in the murder were totally false.
39. See Moore v. State, 12 Ala. 764, 46 Am. Dec. 276 (1848).
40. See W. Shakespeare, King John, Act V, Scene 4.
41. Wigmore § 1438. For a further discussion of the purported effect of impending death
on the veracity of the dying person see Quick, supra note 2, at 111-12.
42. 16 Va. L. Rev., supra note 2, at 827.
43. Wigmore § 1438 and cases noted therein. The "sincerity" guarantee with its religious
aspects is still accepted by most modem courts. People v. Aarhus, ill Ill. App. 2d 167, 248
N.E.2d 820 (1969); People v. Gezzo, 307 N.Y. 385, 121 N.E.2d 380 (1954).
44. See Note, Evidence-A Comparison of the New York and Uniform Rules on Ad-
missibility of Hearsay Evidence, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1100, 1114 (1956); 16 Va. L. Rev.,
supra note 2, at 827-28.
45. E.g., People v. Bartelini, 285 N.Y. 433, 35 N.E.2d 29 (1941), where the court, in
speaking of dying declarations, said: "If we look for the basis upon which rests this excep-
tion, we find it in the assumption, born of experience, that 'the approach of death produces
a state of mind in which the utterances of the dying person are to be taken as free of
ordinary motives to mis-state....' The fact that the exception has as its basis only the
assumption mentioned above . . . [means] that extreme caution is required of the trial
court before a dying declaration is received in evidence . . . ." 285 N.Y. at 439-40, 35
N.E.2d at 32 [emphasis omitted].
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Belief in the imminence of death .. is considered an effective deterrent to conscious
or unconscious falsification, and when supernaturalism had a more zealous following,
this may have acted as a substantial barrier to falsification. It is dubious, however,
whether under modem conditions, with the breakdown of unquestioning belief in, and
concern with, religious doctrines on the part of many, the inference is a valid one.
Even in deeply religious communities it is very doubtful that the inference could be
properly drawn.47
It has also been pointed out that no empirical studies are available as to the
psychological effect that the knowledge of imminent, certain death has on a
human being.48
There are several other factors which tend to weaken the argument that
dying declarations are inherently trustworthy. First, the declarant, being in
pain and agony as a result of the wounds that he received, may have a defective
memory. Second, the declarant, surrounded by his family and friends, is apt to
state only his side of the affair. Third, the dying declaration is apt to be dis-
tracting and confusing to the witness to whom it is related. Fourth, those about
the declarant do not usually seek to elicit qualifying facts unfavorable to the
declarant. 49
Dying declarations are also admitted because they are necessary. The neces-
sity principle has been given two interpretations. The first interpretation argues
that since the declarant is unavailable the court will be deprived of his
evidence unless it is allowed to use his extra-judicial statements.5 This broad
view of necessity appears tenuous, since in every hearsay situation, unless an
exception is made, the court is being deprived of the declarant's statement;
nevertheless, the evidence is excluded.
The narrower and more widely accepted view is that dying declarations are
necessary in order to bring murderers to justice.5 ' Those who agree with the
second interpretation believe that since homicide is often a secret crime the
dying declarant is often the only witness, and the guilty person may escape
punishment if the declaration is not admitted into evidence. However, dying
declarations have been admitted in cases where the killing was not secret, where
46. An illustration of the secularization of our society is the fact that at common law
a dying declarant could be impeached on the ground that he did not believe in a Supreme
Being. State v. Elliot, 45 Iowa 486 (1877); Hill v. State, 64 Miss. 431, 1 So. 494 (1887).
But the modern view is that the constitutional provisions which guarantee freedom of
religion have eliminated the common law requirement that the dying declarant believe In a
Supreme Being. Wright v. State, 24 Ala. App. 378, 135 So. 636 (1931). Swancarat Religion
in the Law of Dying Declarations, 66 U.S.L. Rev. 192 (1932).
47. Quick, supra note 2, at 111-12. See also Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-
A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev, 741, 749-50
(1965).
48. Quick, supra note 2, at 112.
49. 16 Va. L. Rev., supra note 2, at 828.
50. Wigmore § 1421.
51. E.g., Phillips v. Dow Chem. Co., 247 Miss. 293, 151 So. 2d 199 (1963); People v.
Portugay, 140 Misc. 688, 251 N.Y.S. 389 (N.Y. County Ct. 1931) ; Railing v. Commonwealth,
110 Pa. 100, 1 A. 314 (1885). See 1 S. Greenleaf, Evidence § 156 (16th ed. 1899).
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there was other adequate testimony, 52 and even where the murder was con-
ceded.53 Some writers feel that this illustrates the self-contradictory aspects of
this rationale, in that if public necessity was logically construed, a dying
declaration would be used only where it was the only evidence that the prosecu-
tion had against the accused.54 There could be situations where the only
evidence possessed by the prosecution in a homicide case is the dying declara-
tion of the victim, and in such a case the narrower view would make more sense.
However, the denial of the accused's right to confront the witnesses against
him, and the possible prejudicial effect of the dying declaration being admitted
into evidence in the vast majority of cases where it is not the only evidence
possessed by the prosecution,5 5 greatly outweighs upholding the dying declara-
tion because it might be necessary for conviction in a few cases.
Even in those cases where the dying declaration is the only evidence against
the accused, the absence of other evidence and the dramatic effect of the dying
declaration, which might cause a jury to give it greater weight than it actually
merits, would appear to militate against its admission.50 However, it appears at
present that an accused may properly be found guilty solely on an uncorrob-
orated dying declaration.57 The "public necessity" rationale has been criticized
as "obviously a makeshift reason"58 and since practically every murder conviction
is obtained without the aid of dying declarations,"0 it would appear that dying
declarations are not indispensable to the prosecution of homicides. The "public
52. Lyles v. State, 48 Teax. Crim. 119, 86 S.W. 763 (1905).
53. State v. Saunders, 14 Ore. 300, 12 P. 441 (1886).
54. 16 Va. L. Rev., supra note 2, at 826-27.
55. See id. at 827.
56. See Note, Dying Declarations-Instructions by the Trial Court, 32 Neb. L. Rev. 461,
467 (1953).
57. See, e.g., Crowell v. State, 233 Ala. 201, 171 So. 267 (1936); People v. Amaya, 134
Cal. 531, 66 P. 794 (1901). Cf. People v. Ludkoivitz, 266 N.Y. 233, 194 N.E. 688 (1935)
(dictum).
58. Quick, supra note 2, at 111.
59. Letter from Irwin J. Goldsmith, First Assistant District Attorney, Bronx County to
the Fordham Law Review, November 13, 1969. Mr. Goldsmith, a noted prosecutor, stated in
his letter that, "In my 23 years as a Trial Assistant in this office and having been Chief of
the Rackets Bureau ... I have never had occasion to use a 'dying declaration' ....
I might further add that in my experience as Chief of the Homicide Bureau of this office
in the past three years we have handled about 700 cases of homicide and have never used
a 'dying declaration'. In my experience as a Trial Assistant ...I have handled at least
2000 to 2500 cases and never once had occasion to use a 'dying declaration'." Assistant
District Attorney Goldsmith feels, however, that dying declarations are generally reliable and
the primary reason that they are not used are the unrealistically stringent requirements
governing their admission into evidence, i.e., the declarant must be in extremis and have no
hope of recovery before his declaration will qualify as a dying declaration.
Mr. Goldsmith's statement as to the use of dying declarations by the Bronx D.A.'s office
illustrates that the dying declaration is unnecessary for the successful prosecution of homicides.
For a further discussion of the infrequency of use of dying declarations in obtaining homicide
convictions, see 16 Va. L. Rev., supra note 2, at 827.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
necessity" doctrine developed at a time when police detection was not nearly
as scientific and efficient as it is today. As one writer has stated, "it seems
that the science of criminology has largely obviated this necessity [of dying
declarations] by development of new techniques such as fingerprinting, ballistics
and the like. True, evidence by these means is largely circumstantial, but it
cannot be seriously doubted that it is ordinarily more reliable than statements
of a man whose faculties may be greatly impaired by a mortal wound and
thoughts of approaching death."160 In no class of cases should doubtful evidence
be more severely restricted or excluded than in cases that may result in in-
carceration for life or a sentence of death. It would appear that the "public
necessity" rationale is self-contradictory and is not supported by empirical
evidence.61
IV. WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN DYING DECLARATIONS AND JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A. Evidentiary Weight
"As a general rule, it is the function of the trial judge to determine the
competency and admissibility of evidence and the function of the jury to weigh
its probative value and credibility."02 However, there is disagreement among
courts as to the proper weight to be given dying declarations and as to the
instructions, if any, that are to be given by the court to the jury regarding
such declarations.63 Some courts have held that the evidentiary value or weight
of dying declarations is equal to that of the evidence presented under oath and
before the jury.64 However, many courts have stated that dying declarations
are of less evidentiary value and weight than evidence given under oath which
is subject to cross-examination. 5 The courts which hold that dying declarations
are of less evidentiary value than statements made under oath do so because of
a suspicion that dying declarations are not inherently trustworthy. 60
B. Instructions to the Jury
There is also a disagreement among American jurisdictions as to what a judge
may or should tell the jury about the weight to be given dying declarations.0 7
The answer to this question depends in part on whether, in a particular juris-
60. 22 La. L. Rev. 651, supra note 2, at 662-63.
61. 16 Va. L. Rev., supra note 2, at 827.
62. Note, Dying Declarations, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 375, 386 (1961). See Annot., 167 A.L.R.
147, 148-58 (1947).
63. Annot., 167 A.L.R. 184-94 (1947).
64. State v. Johns, 152 Iowa 383, 132 NAV. 832 (1911); Commonwealth v. Brown, 388
Pa. 613, 131 A.2d 367 (1957), which held that while the dying declaration should be given
the same weight as other evidence, it would be error for the court to so instruct the jury.
See also Hubbard v. State, 208 Ga. 472, 67 S.E.2d 562 (1951).
65. People v. Mleczko, 298 N.Y. 153, 81 N.E.2d 65 (1948); People v. Ludkowltz, 266
N.Y. 233, 194 N.E. 688 (1935); People v. Falletto, 202 N.Y. 494, 96 N.E. 355 (1911). Cf.
State v. Gallegos, 28 N.M. 403, 213 P. 1030 (1923), where the court held it error to give In-
structions to the jury that dying declarations are entitled to the same weight as statements
made under oath.
66. 202 N.Y. 494, 499-500, 96 N.E. 357, 358 (1911).
67. Quick, supra note 2, at 132.
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diction, the judge has a right to comment on the evidence.u If the judge has
this right then he may instruct the jury on the evidentiary weight of the dying
declaration.69 Where the judge is not allowed to comment, because it is felt
that his remarks would be an invasion of the jury function, then he would of
course be prohibited from instructing on the weight to be given the dying
declaration.70 However, even though they disagree as to what a judge may or
should say, the courts of this country are in general agreement with the proposi-
tion that dying declarations should be weighed by the jury with great caution.--
There is a difference between instructing the jury to receive and weigh dying
declarations with caution, and instructing the jury as to the amount of evi-
dentiary weight to be given such declarations. 72 The former is held not to be
a comment on the evidence, while the latter is held to be a comment on the
evidence.73 As a result, some states require74 or permitT5 the judge to instruct
the jury that dying declarations are to be weighed with great caution, while
some do not permit instructions to this effect. 76 The courts which require or
permit cautionary instructions do so because they recognize that a dying
declaration is a dramatic piece of evidence, which might impress the jury far
beyond its probative value.77 While this inherent weakness of dying declarations
has not received the attention from the courts that it deserves,7 8 it has been
seriously considered by some courts and writers. 70 Professor Wharton has said:
Dying declarations have every element of dramatic evidence. As the last utterance of
a sentient, conscious being, standing on the threshold of eternity, they possess an
impressiveness out of all proportion to their evidentiary value. In all homicide cases, the
elemental passions are at any moment apt to override the judgment. A court may
be judicial and impartial, and a jury dispassionate, up to the point where the dying
declaration is admitted, and then find its impartiality and self-restraint seriously tried
over the recital of the dying declaration.80
In Commonwealth v. Muljerno,81 the court, although affirming the defendant's
68. In the majority of American jurisdictions, the judge does not have the right to
comment upon the evidence. McCormick § 263.
69. Id.
70. Quick, supra note 2, at 132.
71. People v. Johnson, 334 Mich. 169, 54 N.W.2d 206 (1952); People v. Bartelini, 285
N.Y. 433, 35 N.E.2d 29 (1941); Annot., 167 A.R. 147, 159 (1947).
72. 32 Neb. L. Rev., supra note 56, at 463.
73. Id.
74. Humphreys v. State, 166 Tenn. 523, 64 S.W.2d 5 (1933); State v. Mayo, 42 Wash.
540, 85 P. 251 (1906).
75. Dowdel v. State, 194 Ga. 578, 22 S.E.2d 310 (1942); Commonwealth v. Meleskie,
278 Pa. 383, 123 A. 310 (1924).
76. See, e.g., Shenkenberger v. State, 154 Ind. 630, 57 N.E. 519 (1900).
77. 46 Iowa L. Rev., supra note 62, at 376.
78. 32 Neb. L. Rev., supra note 56, at 467.
79. See, e.g., State v. Le Duc, 89 Mont. 545, 300 P. 919 (1931) (dissenting opinion) ; Still
v. State, 125 Tenn. 80, 140 S.W. 298 (1911); Hale v. State, 112 Te.m. Crim. 422, 16 S.W.2d
1068 (1929). See 1 F. Wharton, Evidence in Criminal Issues 529 (10th ed.) [hereinafter
cited as Wharton].
80. Wharton at 529.
81. 265 Pa. 247, 108 A. 639 (1919).
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conviction of murder, said, "[w] e realize the force of the suggestion, that dying
declarations possess an impressiveness, which is sometimes out of all proportion
to their evidentiary value, and the court and jury may sometimes have their
better judgment overridden by the admission of such statements, having the
effect of sweeping away their impartial attitude, and substituting for it the
emotional element, as presented by the picture depicted by the dying man
.... "82 There have been cases where the court has reversed a conviction for
homicide, in part because they recognized the dramatic effect that a dying
declaration may have had on a jury. 3 The dramatic and emotional impact of
a dying declaration, when considered with the doubtful reasons for allowing
their admission, is of great importance in considering the possible unconstitu-
tionality of dying declarations.
V. RECENT CASES
In Bruton v. United States,8 4 the petitioner and his co-defendant Evans were
charged with armed postal robbery85 and were convicted in a joint federal trial,
largely on the basis of a postal inspector's testimony that Evans had made an
oral confession which inculpated petitioner. Petitioner contended on appeal
that the admission of the confession was prejudicial because he had been denied
his constitutional right to cross-examine the witness against him. The
Court of Appeals 6 found that Evans' confession was coerced, and set aside his
conviction,8 7 but affirmed the finding of the petitioner's guilt. The Court of
Appeals relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Delli Paoli v. United States,88
that the limiting instructions employed by the trial judge were sufficient, under
the circumstances of the case, to enable the jury to determine the defendant's
guilt without considering the inadmissible hearsay. 9 The Supreme Court, rely-
82. Id. at 249, 108 A. at 640.
83. See Jollay v. State, 130 Tenn. 286, 170 S.W. 58 (1914). The defendant Jollay was
convicted of murder. The decedent's dying declaration was declared to be inadmissible because
it did not appear that he had sufficient consciousness and intelligence to make a factual dying
declaration. Therefore, the court, recognizing the dramatic impact of his dying declaration,
coupled with the fact that there was a good deal of evidence that tended to weaken or
destroy certain of the prosecution witness' testimony, declared that the dying declaration was
so prejudicial as to constitute reversible error. 130 Tenn. at 309-10, 170 S.W. at 64-65. The
court felt there was ample evidence in the record to support the state's contentions without
the dying declaration. The court felt that any doubt as to its admissibility should be
resolved more against the dying declaration being admissible, due in part to Its emotional
impact upon the jury.
84. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (1964).
86. 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967).
87. The Court of Appeals ruling reversing Evans' conviction was based on Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) because Evans had not been notified of his rights before lie
made the alleged confession to the postal inspector. 375 F.2d at 361.
88. 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
89. Delli Paoli was a modification of Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947)
which held that the jury's ability to follow the instructions of the trial judge was not open
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ing on Jackson v. Denno,90 Pointer v. Texas,9' and Douglas v. Alabama,2 held
that petitioner's right to confront the witnesses against him had been violated
and reversed his conviction, thereby overturning Delli Paoli.03 The Supreme
Court in Bruton applied the rationale of Jackson by agreeing with the sugges-
tion made in People v. Aranda, 4 that " [i] f it is a denial of due process to rely
on a jury's presumed ability to disregard an involuntary confession, it may also
be a denial of due process to rely on a jury's presumed ability to disregard a
co-defendant's confession implicating another defendant when it is determining
that defendant's guilt or innocence." 95 However, in Bruton, Mr. Justice Brennan
refused to accept Jackson as meaning that a jury can never follow instructions
to disregard inadmissible evidence. 0 The Court in Bruton appeared to establish
a balancing test to determine whether a limiting instruction is proper. The test
would weigh the probability that the jury would not be able to follow the
court's instructions against the amount of harm which would be done to the
defendant if the jury failed to follow the instructions.97
Several courts have regarded limiting instructions with suspicion. In Nash v.
United States,98 Judge Learned Hand said that the limiting instruction is a
"recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only
their powers, but anybody's else [sic].*"09 Moreover, a well known study of
jury behavior concluded that limiting instructions, rather than furthering the
to question. However, in Delli Paoli the Supreme Court held that the circumstances of
each case have to be considered in determining whether limiting instructions are sufficient
to protect a co-defendants' trial position. 352 U.S. at 239.
90. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
91. 380 US. 400 (1965).
92. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
93. 391 US. at 126. Bruton was held to be retroactive in Roberts v. Russell, 392 US.
293 (1968).
94. 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965).
95. Id. at 528-29, 407 P.2d at 271, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 359. In Jackson, the New York pro-
cedure of allowing the jury to decide the voluntariness of the defendant's confession was
held to be a violation of due process. The Court, in overruling Stein v. New York, 346 US.
156 (1953), adopted the statement that "[tjhe naive assumption that prejudicial effects can
be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated
fiction.' Krulewitch v. United States, 336 US. 440, 453 (1949) (concurring opinion) (cita-
tions omitted).
96. 391 U.S. at 135. Mr. Justice Brennan cited Lutwak v. United States, 344 US. 604
(1953) and Hopt v. Utah, 120 US. 430 (1887) (dictum) as two examples of cases where
limiting instructions would remedy an error by the trial court. In Lutwak, a single admis-
sion of hearsay was not error in light of the other evidence against the accused. In Hopt,
an error of improper admission of expert testimony was cured by its withdrawal and
instructions to the jury to disregard it.
97. 391 U.S. at 136-37; Note, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 234
(1968) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Term].
98. 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 285 US. 556 (1932).
99. Id. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 US. 440 (1949) (dissent); People v.
Aranda, supra note 94; People v. Barbaro, 395 IMI. 264, 69 N.E2d 692 (1946); State v.
Rosen, 151 Ohio 339, 86 N.E.2d 24 (1949).
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search for truth, probably confuses the jurors and increases the possibility of
injustice.100 In Bruton, Mr. Justice Brennan, agreeing that jury instructions
can be confusing and prejudicial said, "[d]espite the concededly clear instruc-
tions to the jury to disregard Evans' inadmissible hearsay evidence inculpating
petitioner, in the context of a joint trial we cannot accept limiting instructions
as an adequate substitute for petitioner's constitutional right of cross-examina-
tion. The effect is the same as if there had been no instruction at all." 10'
In recent years, the Supreme Court has decided several important cases in-
volving the confrontation clause. In Pointer v. Texas, the Supreme Court held
that the constitutional right of an accused to confront witnesses against him
is made obligatory on the states by the fourteenth amendment. 10 2 The Court
felt that the right of confrontation necessarily included the right of cross-
examination. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority in Pointer stated:
It cannot seriously be doubted at this late date that the right of cross-examination is
included in the right of ,an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses
against him. And probably no one, certainly no one experienced in the trial of lawsuits,
would deny the value of cross-examination in exposing falsehood and bringing out
the truth in the trial of a criminal case .... The fact that this right appears in the
Sixth Amendment of our Bill of Rights reflects the belief of the Framers of those
liberties and safeguards that confrontation was a fundamental right essential to a fair
trial in a criminal prosecution.' 0 3
In Douglas v. Alabama, 04 which applied Pointer, and was relied upon in
Bruton, the prosecution read statements from the out-of-court confession of one
co-defendant under the guise of refreshing his memory. These statements in-
culpated petitioner. The codefendant, relying on his privilege against self-
incrimination, neither denied nor affirmed that he had made the confession. The
100. Kalven, A Report on the Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law School, 24
Ins. Counsel J. 368, 371-72 (1957). One hypothesis of the project dealt with the ability of the
jury to follow curative instructions. In a personal injury action to recover damages from
an auto accident, the following variables were presented to an experimental jury: (1) the
defendant disclosed that he had no liability insurance and no objection was made by the
plaintiff. The average verdict for the plaintiff was $33,000. (2) the defendant disclosed
that he had liability insurance and no objection was made by the plaintiff. The average
verdict was $37,000. (3) the defendant disclosed that he had liability insurance and an
objection was made by the plaintiff. The judge then instructed the jury to disregard this
evidence. The average verdict was $46,000.
The conclusion was that an instruction to disregard, instead of preventing the jurors
from considering the insurance, sensitized the jury to that evidence. Broeder, The University
of Chicago Jury Project, 38 Neb. L. Rev. 744, 754 (1959). If a jury can disregard a clear
curative instruction concerning certain prejudicial evidence, it must be seriously questioned
whether a cautionary instruction to the jury as to the weight to be given a "dramatic"
dying declaration can be adhered to.
101. 391 U.S. at 137.
102. 380 U.S. at 406.
103. Id. at 404.
104. 380 U.S. 415 (1965)
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Supreme Court held that petitioner was denied his right to cross-examine the
witnesses against him. 0 5
It has been noted that the decision in Bruton did not have to have constitu-
tional implications.' 0 6 The question concerning the Court in Bruton was whether,
and if so, why, the inculpatory parts of Evans' confession had to be excluded
from evidence. Under the federal evidentiary rules, the statement "was inad-
missible hearsay, a presumptively unreliable out-of-court statement of a non-
party who was not a witness subject to cross-examination."'01 7 Thus, the Court
could have held that limiting instructions would no longer be acceptable to
remove the type of prejudicial inadmissible hearsay evidence that was used in
the case at bar from the consideration of the jury. 08 The Court specifically
refused to answer the question as to the possible effects that the decision would
have on the established exceptions to the hearsay rule. 0 9 The hearsay rule and
the confrontation clause have been thought to be generally coextensive insofar
as their protection for criminal defendants extends," 0 because at the very core
of both is the right of cross-examination."' The Supreme Court has never sug-
gested that the overlap is definitely coextensive."12 However, the Court, in
deciding cases which involved an interpretation of the sixth amendment, has
had to consider whether the hearsay exceptions recognized by the common law
are permitted under the sixth amendment." 3 In general the Court has answered
in the affirmative.114 This static view of the sixth amendment as sanctioning the
exceptions which existed at the time of the sixth amendment's adoption has
been criticized as violative of the principle that the Constitution has to be con-
stantly reevaluated in light of society's changing needs and attitudes.15 As
105. Id. at 419.
106. 1967 Term, supra note 97, at 235-36.
107. 391 U.S. at 138 (White, J., dissenting).
108. Since Bruton involved a joint trial of two codefendants, the Court could have
ordered a severance under R Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 without having to consider the con-
stitutional issue of denial of confrontation.
109. 391 U.S. at 128 n3, where the Court stated: "There is not before us, therefore,
any recognized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as petitioner is concerned and we
intimate no view whatever that such exceptions necessarily raise questions under the Con-
frontation Clause."
110. Wigmore § 1397; 1967 Term, supra note 97, at 236.
111. The main objection to hearsay evidence is the inability of a defendant to cross-
examine witnesses against him. McCormick § 225, Wigmore § 1362. Two additional objec-
tions are the inability of the jury to observe the demeanor of the witness, Mattox v. United
States, 156 US. 237, 242 (1895); and the fact that the declarant is not under oath and
there is a possibility that the evidence will not be repeated exactly as it was related to the
witness. McCormick § 225.
112. 1967 Term, supra note 97, at 236.
113. Id.
114. Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 243 (1895). See McCoy, The Right of Confrontation, 1959 Wash. U.L.Q. 122, 126.
115. Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence
in Criminal Trials, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 746 (1965).
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stated by Chief Justice Marshall, "we must never forget, that it is a constitu-
tion we are expounding,""" and that it is "intended to endure for ages to come,
and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."' 1 7
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DYING DECLARATION
The United States Supreme Court has never decided whether the dying
declaration violates the confrontation clause.118 However, there are statements
in several decisions which indicate that dying declarations are thought to be
constitutional." 9 The cases in which the Supreme Court has viewed the dying
declaration as not being violative of the confrontation clause involved excep-
tions to the hearsay rule other than the dying declaration. 120 The Supreme
Court has justified the constitutionality of the dying declaration on the basis
that the Court is bound "to interpret the Constitution in the light of the law
as it existed at the time it was adopted, not as reaching out for new guaranties of
the rights of the citizen, but as securing to every individual such as he already
possessed as a British subject .... ,121 and therefore recognized that exceptions
to the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, such as dying declarations, were
to be respected. This is clearly not consonant with Chief Justice Marshall's
view of constitutional interpretation. 122 The dying declaration is no longer
relevant to the needs or beliefs of the nation.
In sustaining the constitutionality of the dying declaration, some courts have
taken the position that the dying declarant is not to be regarded as the witness
whom the accused is constitutionally entitled to confront or to meet face to
face.' 23 This reasoning has not received unanimous acceptance. In State v.
Houser,"24 the court, in commenting upon the reasoning that the witness who
relates the dying declaration to the court is the real witness, said, "[i]t is the
dying man who is speaking through him, whose evidence is to have weight and
116. McColluch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 207, 264 (1819).
117. Id. at 269.
118. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) (dictum); Shepard v. United
States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933) (by implication); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330
(1911) (dictum); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (dictum).
119. See cases cited note 118 supra.
120. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (testimony of unavailable witness) ; Shepard
v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933) (prosecution tried to use statement of decedent that
"Dr. Shepard has poisoned me" as evidence evincing a state of mind of the decedent con-
trary to a suicidal state of mind. The prosecutor was trying to rebut evidence presented
by the defendant that the decedent was contemplating suicide. The declaration of the
decedent was not a dying declaration because the decedent had hopes of recovery from
her illness; Dowdel v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911) (certification of trial record on
appeal) ; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (testimony of witnesses unavailable
due to their death).
121. 156 U.S. at 243.
122. McColluch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 207 (1819).
123. State v. Kindle, 47 Ohio 358, 361, 24 N.E. 485, 486 (1890). See also Hawkins v.
State, 220 Tenn. 383, 417 S.W.2d 774 (1967).
124. 26 Mo. 431 (1858).
[Vol. 38
DYING DECLARATIONS
efficacy sufficient. . . to take away the prisoner's life. The living witness is
but a conduit pipe-a mere organ, through whom this evidence is conveyed
to the court and jury."'125 This seems the better view, since in the jury's mind
a dying declaration may well be the equivalent of testimony from the grave,
thereby giving it undue weight and probative force, greatly prejudicing the
defendant. In Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan found that the reading by the
prosecuting attorney of the co-defendants' confession was prejudicial to peti-
tioner in that "[ajlthough the Solicitor's reading of Loyd's alleged statement
... [was] not technically testimony, the Solicitor's reading may well have been
the equivalent in the jury's mind of testimony that Loyd in fact made the
statement . *... ,126 Similarly, in a trial involving a dying declaration, the
dying declarant is the real witness whose words are given probative value.
The theories justifying admission of the dying declaration as an exception
to the hearsay rule are therefore, at their best, most questionable. The basis for
admitting such statements as an exception to the hearsay rule, coupled with
the possible dramatic effect of dying declarations upon a jury,127 and the in-
ability of the defendant to cross-examine the "real" witness, the dying de-
clarant, arguably makes the dying declaration violative of the confrontation
clause of the sixth amendment.'2 8 "A basic premise of the Confrontation Clause
. .. is that certain kinds of hearsay ... are at once so damaging, so suspect,
and yet so difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give such
evidence the minimal weight it logically deserves, whatever instructions the
trial judge might give."'1-9 The dying declaration falls into this category of
hearsay and should be declared inadmissible, at least in criminal cases.
125. Id. at 438. However, the court felt that dying declarations were constitutional
because of the long acquiescence of courts to their not being violative of the confrontation
clause.
126. 380 U.S. at 419.
127. The Supreme Court in Bruton recognized the impossibility of determining whether
in fact the jury did or did not ignore the inadmissible inculpatory confession of one co-
defendant in determining the petitioner's guilt. But as long as the introduction of the out-
of-court confession posed a substantial threat to the petitioner's right to confront the wit-
nesses against him, the Court could not ignore the possible prejudice to the petitioner.
391 US. at 136-37.
128. The dying declaration may also be violative of due process in that its admission
into evidence may so prejudice a defendant as to be a denial of the fundamental fairness
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US. 319, 325 (1937).
A defendant who has been denied due process, rather than a specific constitutional provision,
such as the confrontation clause, may still have his conviction upheld under the "harmless
error" doctrine of Chapman v. California, 386 US. 18 (1967). However, if a specific con-
stitutional provision is violated, no degree of prejudice will be tolerated. Fahy v. Connec-
ticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
129. 391 U.S. at 138 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations and emphasis omitted).
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